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The short-termism trap: Catering to informed investors with limited horizons

Harvard Corporate Governance

In our recent study, “The Short-Termism Trap: Catering to Informed Investors with Limited Horizons,” published in the Journal of Financial Economics, we present a model that illustrates how the short-term focus of informed investors can lead firms and the stock market into a destructive cycle of short-termism. more…)

Finance 275
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Cyber Governance: Growing Expectations for Information Security Oversight and Accountability

Harvard Corporate Governance

At the same time, this dependency exposes corporate issuers to an increasing amount of information security-related risk, raising alarm among stakeholders. Good information security oversight should seek to reduce a company’s potential risk of harmful economic outcomes. more…)

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Separating Ownership and Information

Harvard Corporate Governance

Our paper Separating Ownership and Information , forthcoming in the American Economic Review , provides a new perspective on the separation of ownership and control—the fundamental problem in corporate governance according to classical theories (Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling 1976).

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Secret and Overt Information Acquisition in Financial Markets

Harvard Corporate Governance

Site visits are considered costly and significant activities for investors to acquire information. The idea can be viewed as an extension of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), which aims to prevent selective disclosure of material nonpublic information and ensure a level playing field for all investors.

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Know Your Customer: Informed Trading by Banks

Harvard Corporate Governance

In particular, universal banks could use borrowers’ confidential information when selling securities to investors or trading in capital markets. Despite the persisting political and scholarly debate, it is surprising how little we know about banks’ use of private information and banks’ proprietary trading in general.

Banking 235
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Accounting Information and Risk Shifting with Asymmetrically Informed Creditors

Harvard Corporate Governance

Specifically, we ask how the availability of information, public or private, about the economic condition of a potential borrower affects the cost of debt, the borrowers’ incentive to take on risky projects, and the stability of lending relationships over time.

Banking 112
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The Quality of Earnings Information in Dual-Class Firms

Harvard Corporate Governance

When Google went public with a dual-class capital structure in which shares owned by the founders confer greater voting rights than shares issued to public investors, its cofounders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin, sent shareholders a letter promising to provide them with high-quality information about the company.