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Founders may be reluctant to take on so much risk. Founders typically invest a large percentage of their human and financial capital into their startups and consequently are unable to diversify firm-specificrisk. In our model, VCs address the divergence in risk preference by striking an implicit bargain with founders.
Moreover, large companies typically have deep pockets, which ensures compensation for investors who incurred losses because they traded during the period when stock prices were distorted by false information. Sometimes they are represented on the board, which provides them with direct decision-making powers and access to information.
Perhaps the family had private information about the value of the firm, but this presumably would have been elicited in the special committees scrutiny of the initial take-private offer. Controllers may limit managerial agency costs, but their self-interest produces so-called controlling shareholder agency costs. [2]
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