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Risk-Seeking Corporate Governance

Reynolds Holding

Founders may be reluctant to take on so much risk. Founders typically invest a large percentage of their human and financial capital into their startups and consequently are unable to diversify firm-specific risk. In our model, VCs address the divergence in risk preference by striking an implicit bargain with founders.

Finance 45
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Issuer Liability: Ownership Structure and the Circularity Debate

Reynolds Holding

Most observers agree that they have little to gain from firm-specific activism and have no incentive to reduce fraud because diversification protects them from firm-specific risk. We cannot expect this relationship to change with the rise of institutional investors, especially passive ones following an index.

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Did SB21’s Changes to Delaware Corporate Law Harm Shareholders?

Reynolds Holding

ENDNOTES [1] [link] [2] [link] [3] Our simplified event study compares the returns of equal-weighted portfolios of DE Companies and Non-DE Companies without controls for firm-specific risk factors such as exposure to market risk, size or other industry-specific performance. [4]

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Compulsion No, Opportunity Yes in the Delaware Law of Externalities

Reynolds Holding

Controllers may limit managerial agency costs, but their self-interest produces so-called controlling shareholder agency costs. [2] 3] A specialized financial intermediary, the asset manager, has exploded in significance. [4]