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The contraction of the market for special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) and the recent challenges de-SPACed companies have encountered have attracted considerable press attention. An unprecedented 34% of all 2021 going-public transactions took the form of de-SPAC mergers.
There is no legal reason for this dynamic, which appears to be driven by generally accepted industry precedent and the disparate negotiating leverage that tends to exist in this industry between buyers, who are often large and well-finance consolidators, and sellers, many of whom are smaller, family-owned businesses looking for an exit.
Redemption fees similar to the new rules the SEC recently adopted for prime money-market funds would be directly triggered by high daily outflows of uninsured deposits so as to act as automatic stabilizers. Both measures represent a form of preventive, partial bail-in to preserve going-concernvalue for solvent intermediaries.
In resolving the “record-specific argument” about the role of the deal price in this case, the Supreme Court directed the chancery court to reconsider its approach and disagreed with chancery that regulatory headwinds facing DFC Global undermined the reliability of market prices in this case.
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