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After the rating downgrade, my mailbox was inundated with questions of what this action meant for investing, in general, and for corporatefinance and valuation practice, in particular, and this post is my attempt to answer them all with one post. What is a risk free investment? Why does the risk-free rate matter?
The rise in rates transmitted to corporate bond market rates, with a concurrent rise in default spreads exacerbating the damage to investors. That view has never made sense, because central banking power over rates is at the margin, and the key fundamental drivers of rates are expected inflation and real growth.
In my last three posts, I looked at the macro (equity riskpremiums, default spreads, risk free rates) and micro (company risk measures) that feed into the expected returns we demand on investments, and argued that these expected returns become hurdle rates for businesses, in the form of costs of equity and capital.
The first is that I do not have a macro focus, and my interests in macro variables occur only in the context of corporatefinance or valuation issues. In the same dataset where I compute historical equity riskpremiums, I report historical returns on corporate bonds in two ratings classes (Moody’s Aaa and Baa ratings).
Note that this framework applies for all businesses, from the smallest, privately owned businesses, where debt takes the form of bank loans and even credit card borrowing and equity is owner savings, the largest publicly traded companies, where debt can be in the form of corporate bonds and equity is shares held by public market investors.
in Finance from Purdue University, an MBA from George Mason University, and a B.A. Dr. Everett is the author of the children’s financial literacy thriller Toby Gold and the Secret Fortune, which incorporates such financial topics as saving, investing, banking, entrepreneurship, interest rates, return on investment, and net worth.
In corporatefinance and investing, which are areas that I work in, I find myself doing double takes as I listen to politicians, market experts and economists making statements about company and market behavior that are fairy tales, and data is often my weapon for discerning the truth. Beta & Risk 1. Equity RiskPremiums 2.
In the first five posts, I have looked at the macro numbers that drive global markets, from interest rates to riskpremiums, but it is not my preferred habitat. A few years ago, I wrote a paper for practitioners on the cost of capital , where I described the cost of capital as the Swiss Army knife of finance, because of its many uses.
After the 2008 market crisis, I resolved that I would be far more organized in my assessments and updating of equity riskpremiums, in the United States and abroad, as I looked at the damage that can be inflicted on intrinsic value by significant shifts in riskpremiums, i.e., my definition of a crisis.
Healy before the Subcommittee on Banking and Currency on Wagner-Lea Act, S. Investment companies have been compelled to financebanking clients of the insiders and companies in which they were personally interested. Division of CorporationFinance, No Action Letter: Latham and Watkins (Mar. See generally William A.
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