Remove 2016 Remove Compliance Remove Specific Risk
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MAEjor Ruling: Delaware Court of Chancery Finds Target Suffers Material Adverse Effect and Acquirer Could Back Out of Transaction

Cooley M&A

In reaching these holdings, the court found that: the target’s business experienced a “dramatic, unexpected and company-specific downturn” shortly after signing due in part to “serious and pervasive data integrity problems” that adversely impacted the target’s regulatory compliance.

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Gibson Dunn Offers 2022 Year-End Securities Litigation Update

Reynolds Holding

This figure is significantly lower than in 2016, when the Delaware Court of Chancery effectively put an end to the practice of disclosure-only settlements in In re Trulia Inc. 2016), which helped drive the increase in merger-objection filings between 2015 and 2017. 38 million is also the highest average settlement value since 2016.

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Gibson Dunn Offers 2022 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update

Reynolds Holding

There, Novinger sought to strike a provision in his 2016 settlement agreement with the SEC, preventing him from saying anything in public that might dispute any of the SEC’s allegations against him. 2. Failure To Disclose Specific Risks. The Court Once Again Asked To Consider Gag Rule In Novinger. Novinger , 40 F.4th

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Morrison & Foerster Discusses the Foreign Corruption Risks of Electric Vehicle Production

Reynolds Holding

In December 2016, Brazilian chemical company Braskem S.A. Automakers in the EV space should revisit and update their third-party due diligence procedures, and other compliance measures, to mitigate corruption risk in their battery supply chains. In May 2022, Glencore agreed to pay over $1.1 billion to resolve the U.S.

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Compulsion No, Opportunity Yes in the Delaware Law of Externalities

Reynolds Holding

That legal requirement promotes legal compliance in its own right, while also providing a mechanism for holding fiduciaries accountable when they knowingly cause an entity to violate positive law. 560 (2016). [2] Shareholder Litigation , 2016 WL 5874974 (Del. 2016) (Laster, VC), affd 164 A.3d In In re Match Group, Inc.